Roper V. Simmons (extended arguments)

The last blog entry highlighted the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, and gave some insight into my belief that the decision was wrong. Here are the extended arguments. (submitted for LAW389, dont steal)

Roper v. Simmons: Conflicts with Uniformity

            In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals under the age of eighteen is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, regardless of the crime committed. The Eighth Amendment holds that “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted…”. This Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In this particular case, the Court viewed the death penalty as “cruel and unusual” when pertaining to juveniles, therefore prohibiting their execution. However, I hold that the Court made the wrong decision by focusing on juveniles as a whole and as an age group, rather than the crime committed by an individual. Many details of this case heighten my belief that the Court ruled incorrectly in their opinion. Some of the details that will be discussed will include: the fact that the human brain experiences cognitive development up until the age of twenty-five, the fact that the murder committed by Simmons was aggravated to the fullest extent, and finally the fact that when compared to legal precedent on the subject, Roper doesn’t fit. With that being said, the restriction on the distribution of the death penalty to juveniles cannot and should not be applied uniformly every time. The Eighth Amendment is based on the precept that justice and punishment should be “graduated and proportioned to the offense” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). In my opinion, justice was not served in this case due to the Court’s misconception of what constitutes a “juvenile”.

            Firstly, although I believe that the death penalty should not be inflicted upon minors under the age of fifteen, as stated in Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), there are no major developmental or societal changes that occur in an individual overnight between the ages of seventeen and eighteen. At least none that should prevent a sixteen or seventeen year old from receiving the death penalty. Rather, scientific data concerning brain development shows that the human brain develops from back to front. The prefrontal cortex is in the very front of our brain and is what allows us to rationally reason, as well as control our emotional impulses (Lecture 02/23/12). However, the prefrontal cortex is what develops last in the human brain, and doesn’t fully mature until the age of twenty-five, and sometimes later. In Roper, the Court based their decision on the fact that Simmons was a minor, and only seventeen at the time he committed a capital offense. The Court stated that Simmons was “easily influenced” and that he displayed a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”. The Court goes on to say that the youth are more prone to “ill-considered actions” and irrational decisions due to their age. While this may be true of Simmons, it is also true of every other individual under the age of twenty-five. If Simmons was twenty-one, or even eighteen at the time he committed murder, he would have been sentenced to death. With that being said, why is it not permissible for persons over the age of eighteen, yet under the age of twenty-five to use the same excuse that the Court used for Simmons? According to the scientific data, the brain is still developing at seventeen, as well as eighteen, so the Court should not have imposed this age restriction for capital punishment. Therefore if Roper is valid, then a statue mandating that no one under the age of twenty-five be subject to the death penalty should be valid as well. Essentially, the Court used this scientific data to support a societal definition of what constitutes a juvenile. Although eighteen is an age which allows an individual to vote and smoke, and even gain personal freedoms from their parents, it cannot be used as an appropriate age in which to deprive those who are deserving from receiving the death penalty. The death penalty, therefore, cannot be uniformly applied, especially to juveniles due to differences in personal development of the prefrontal cortex. If a twenty-five year old can be put to death for a capital offense, then according to scientific data, so should a seventeen year old.

            Secondly, I believe that the Court spent too much time focusing on the defendant’s age rather than the crime he actually committed. In his murder, Simmons demonstrated intent, premeditation, and committed robbery, which are all aggravating circumstances when related to murder. In order for an adult (living in a pro death penalty state) to receive the death penalty, they must meet one of three “aggravating” circumstances as set forth in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). The three aggravating circumstances are: premeditation and intent, coupling murder with another felony, and committing particular acts considered especially “heinous”, such as rape or torture (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). Simmons definitely demonstrated two of these aggravating circumstances, and some could even argue that he fulfilled all three. He committed pre-meditated murder with the intent to kill. By telling his friends details of the crime before he even committed it, it is clear that Simmons planned to kill. Simmons also committed another crime while committing murder, which is the second aggravating circumstance. Not only did Simmons kill the woman, he burglarized her home as well. Furthermore, although no evidence of sexual assault was found, one could argue that the crime was particularly heinous due to the fact that binding and other torture-esque materials were used, such as duct tape and electrical wiring. In their opinion, the Court firmly held that Simmons should not receive the death penalty due to his age, not because of the crime he committed. As we saw earlier, Simmons’ age is not a reliable factor when it comes to brain development, and should not have been so heavily used by the Court. In my opinion Simmons demonstrated behavior too drastic for an individual of his age. He met the aggravating circumstances required to receive capital punishment and even told his friends he wouldn’t receive the death penalty because he was a minor. Clearly he understood the law and used his age as a crutch to avoid what he deserved, which was death. This behavior is another reason why the death penalty cannot be uniformly applied to minors. Society cannot afford to let people like Simmons escape justice based on their age.

            Lastly, capital punishment should not be off limits for deserving minors due to the legal precedent that surrounds the issue. In Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty on minors aged sixteen and seventeen does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, regardless of state statutory provisions. This case was coupled with Wilkins v. Missouri (1989). Stanford, seventeen at the time of his murder not only killed but also sodomized and robbed his victim. Wilkins, only sixteen at the time he committed murder, stabbed a convenience store clerk while concealing a weapon which constitutes as criminal action. Both young adults received the death penalty because they were considered a threat to society, and it was determined that juvenile rehabilitation would not suffice (Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989). In the Court’s opinion, led by Justice Scalia, it was stated that the death sentence was not contrary to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989). This brings us to Simmons. His fate was decided only 16 years later, yet yielded extremely different results. Justice Kennedy, using the “national consensus” position, stated that death sentences given to underage minors were “cruel and unusual” and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. He also pointed out that the states were too inconsistent when it came to applicability and the execution of minors (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). Although uneven distribution may be a genuine problem, it is also a problem for of-age adults who receive the death penalty. An adult can murder in one state and get a death sentence, yet murder in another and receive life in prison. Therefore, I find Justice Kennedy’s opinion on this matter irrelevant, since adults are not afforded the same exclusion. Most cases that have deep roots in the past, and legal precedent behind them are only traditionally overturned due to evolving histories and societal customs. Yet this case doesn’t quite fit that mold. Simmons behavior was no different than the behavior of Stanford and Wilkins. All three of them demonstrated a high cognitive level of planning and execution, and all three committed violent, heinous crimes. However, only two received the death penalty. The only logical explanation for this reversal is the changing attitude of the Court itself overtime. The Court, although supposedly counter-majoritarian, paid more attention to public opinion in this case. The only problem I have with this is the fact that only sixteen years exist between these cases. Could public opinion really have changed that much? Enough to warrant a reversal by the United States Supreme Court? I don’t think so. Justice Scalia, leading the majority opinion in Stanford cited Gregg v. Georgia (1976) by stating that: "We discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. [...] and to mean that as the dissent means […] that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive the society through its democratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of what we think "proportionate" and "measurably contributory to acceptable goals of punishment" -- to say and mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings." This deduction of logic and law does not exist in Roper. To me, this clearly shows that the Court got it wrong in Roper, due to the fact that they put themselves in a position in which to deny juveniles of justice, making them what Scalia feared them to become, which are philosophers.  Furthermore, statistics have shown that crime among young adults has increased 168%, and that 10% of all homicides are committed by minors under the age of eighteen (Regan). With that being said, the punishments against minors should have gotten more strict, or at least left open to the availability of the death sentence. In short, when you stack Roper up against Stanford and Wilkins, it just doesn’t add up. With that being said, the death penalty should be available for minors who commit the ultimate crime, aggravated murder. It goes against precedent and scientific data to uniformly deny every minor the possibility of receiving the death penalty.

            Based on the scientific data and legal precedent presented here, it is clear that there is no way for justice to be served if the death penalty is unavailable to minors. Not all minors should receive the death penalty for crimes, or even murders they commit. However, it should be available and used for minors that commit heinous, aggravated murders. For some juveniles, rehabilitation does not suffice and they need to be punished to the full extent of the law. The reasons that the Court used to back up their opinion are invalid. Yes, young adults are still developing their reasoning and emotional skills, however, so are adults, all the way up to age twenty-five. If the Court is going to make exceptions for minors based on their developing brain, they should do the same for middle-aged adults. I hold that the death penalty is not “cruel and unusual” when pertaining to minors and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment, when applied sparingly, not uniformly. We cannot place all minors into one big melting pot and punish everyone in the same way. Some minors, like Simmons and Stanford, require special attention and must answer to the call of justice, regardless of their age. With that being said, the distribution of capital punishment upon minors should not be uniform. It should be distributed on a case-by-case basis in order to protect the integrity of society, as well as to protect it from dangerous juveniles.

Physician-assisted suicide: morality and legality

  Physician assisted suicide is a concept that involves the actions of two individuals, one of which wants to voluntarily end their life, and the other who assists in achieving death. Although physician assisted suicide, also known as active euthanasia, remains illegal in all but two states, many moral questions and concerns still linger. On one side, it is believed that an individual possesses personal autonomy and therefore has a right to die under their own circumstances and wishes. On the other side, coupled with legal precedent, is the belief that physician assisted suicide is a slippery slope that violates the sanctity of life and the professional integrity of those assisting in it. This paper will provide examples and arguments for both sides of the issue, and will delve deeper into the morality of physician assisted suicide.

            Before jumping into the arguments of James Rachels, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia involves that actual voluntary “killing” of an individual by another individual. This normally happens via lethal injection. Passive euthanasia, a legal alternative, involves the withholding of a life sustaining treatment such as food and water or life supporting machines. Rachels argues in favor of euthanasia and states that if a person thinks passive euthanasia is morally acceptable, then they ought to think that active euthanasia is morally valid as well. Rachels bases his argument on three points, two of which will be covered in the next paragraph. His first point is that both active and passive euthanasia involve an individual choosing to die, under their autonomy. On the passive side, the individual is choosing to refuse life sustaining treatment, which will ultimately lead to their death. On the active side, the individual is choosing to receive a lethal injection, which will also result in death. On the same token, the physician involved must remove life support (or other forms of life sustaining treatment), as well as administer a lethal injection. This makes his or her involvement apparent on both sides, which is a critical issue when it comes to assisted suicide. The doctor’s involvement is a crucial argument for those against physician assisted suicide, because they consider it a homicide. However, the physician must be directly involved in passive euthanasia as well.

            A second argument in support of physician assisted suicide also stems from the ideas of James Rachels. He states that active euthanasia can actually reduce the amount of suffering and pain that an individual experiences. Often times, an individual who is considering active euthanasia is suffering from a painful, terminal disease and must succumb to equally painful treatments. Some face weekly dialysis treatments, and for an unlucky few with diseases such as brain or throat cancer, treatments are unavailable due to the location of the cancer, and they must constantly suffer. Rachels argues that active euthanasia is sometimes more humane than passive in achieving minimal amounts of pain. Both of Rachels’ arguments, individual autonomy and the reduction of suffering, boil down to the fact that there is no intrinsic moral difference between active and passive euthanasia. In the example of Smith and Jones this becomes clear. Smith killed his nephew by drowning him in a bathtub, in order to receive his life insurance money. Jones was planning on doing the same exact thing, except before he could follow through with his plans, his nephew hit his head in the bathtub and consequently drowned. Morally speaking, there are no differences between Smith and Jones. They sought the same motive, and achieved the same results. With that being said, the difference between actively killing and passively letting die is morally insignificant.

            Although Rachels’ arguments seem valid, and reason enough to legalize physician assisted suicide, the United States Supreme Court has a very different story to tell. In Vacco v. Quill (1997), the Court held that a prohibition on assisting suicide does not violate the equal protection clause under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This decision kept physician assisted suicide illegal in the United States, and followed precedent set forth by the Court in earlier years. In its decision, the Court went on to say that when an individual refuses life sustaining treatment, they will die. However, they will die due to natural causes and their underlying disease, not because the treatment was removed. On the contrary, if an individual chooses a lethal injection they will die due to the medication that is administered to them. Death by overdose of medication is not a “natural cause”. Not only is death by lethal injection an unnatural cause, it has to involve another person, which constitutes as homicide. The patient who chooses a lethal injection as a means to an end must consult a physician, who in turn offers advice and ultimately administers a lethal overdose of medication in order to achieve death. The Court stated that not only is homicide illegal, but also that the ones “killing” in this situation are doctors. In the eyes of society, doctors are regarded as healers, not killers. Furthermore, by assisting others in suicide, the doctor involved is violating his or her Hippocratic Oath to heal and protect. The Court held a similar stance in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg. In this decision, the Court held that the state “has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession”, as well as the vulnerable from coercion. The Court’s decision in this case raises two very important arguments against physician assisted suicide. The first, mentioned earlier in this paragraph, is the issue of doctors being “killers” instead of healers. The second argument is that if voluntary assisted suicide were made legal, then a possibility of involuntary assisted suicide exists. Financial burdens and mental illness could become grounds for an individual seeking out active euthanasia, which defeats the purpose behind physician assisted suicide, which is to relieve intolerable pain and suffering from those facing death. By looking to the Supreme Court for answers to moral questions concerning physician assisted suicide, the legality of the issue is made clear. Physician assisted suicide is illegal in the law of the land.

            In his article I Will Give no Deadly Drug, Leon Kass argues against physician assisted suicide on grounds that it is a slippery slope. By slippery slope it is meant that by legalizing active euthanasia, doors leading to abuse of the system are opened. To back up his argument Kass states that there is no objective way to measure or define an amount of pain or suffering that is intolerable consistently for every individual. For example, a tolerable amount of pain for one patient might be completely intolerable for another. This becomes a problem when it comes to applying the “rules” of physician assisted suicide. Who is allowed to choose it? How much pain is too much? It is a problem in that the solution cannot be measured or inferred. Furthermore, extending on his slippery slope argument, Kass states that “the vast majority of candidates who ‘merit’ an earlier death cannot request it for themselves” (Kass 26). By this it is meant that many people who would be faced with the option of assisted suicide are in a vegetative state. If an individual is in a coma, or is already on life support, and they can’t make the decision for themselves, who is to make the decision for them? This goes hand in hand with the question asked earlier: If we cannot objectively measure intolerable suffering, who do we administer lethal injections to? These are questions that are hard to answer due to people’s moral differences, but they remain valid questions when it comes to opposing physician assisted suicide.

            Personally, I believe that although there are some positive benefits to physician assisted suicide, it is impossible to evenly apply it to everyone who seeks it. In my eyes, assisted suicide is morally acceptable and “legal” in theory, but it remains inappropriate and morally unacceptable in practice. I do admit that there are certain rare cases that could justifiably warrant the use of active euthanasia. However, the law must be evenly applied to everyone and it cannot just be valid for an accepted few. If it is available to one, it is available to all. Not everyone who wishes to die by physician assistance should be subject to its availability. For some, the amount of pain and suffering they experience is subject to their mental state and will to live at the time of their decision. Others may seek it for the wrong reasons, or as an easy way out of a difficult financial or emotional situation. With that being said, I ultimately have to agree with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the arguments of Leon Kass. Physician assisted suicide is a slippery slope that cannot be evenly applied or justified and therefore must remain illegal.

*submitted for pol324 do not steal.